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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
Nos. 96-5633, 96-5634, 96-5661, 96-5738 
 
SERGEANT DONNA M. HURLEY; PATRICK K. HURLEY, 
husband and wife, 
 
v. 
 
THE ATLANTIC CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, 
a subdivision of the City of Atlantic City; 
HENRY MADAMBA; NICHOLAS V. RIFICE; 
JOHN MOONEY; JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 50 
inclusive, fictitious name defendants, jointly, 
severally, and in the alternative 
 
(Camden New Jersey District Civil No. 93-260) 
 
SERGEANT DONNA M. HURLEY; PATRICK K. HURLEY, 
wife and husband 
 
v. 
 
THE ATLANTIC CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, 
a subdivision of the City of Atlantic City; 
HENRY MADAMBA; NICHOLAS V. RIFICE; 
JOHN MOONEY; JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 50, 
inclusive, jointly, severally, and in the alternative 
 
(Camden, New Jersey District Civil No. 94-1122) 
 
Atlantic City Police Department, 
       Appellant No. 96-5633 
 
SERGEANT DONNA M. HURLEY; PATRICK K. HURLEY, 
husband and wife, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
THE ATLANTIC CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, 
a subdivision of the City of Atlantic City; 
HENRY MADAMBA; NICHOLAS V. RIFICE; 
JOHN MOONEY; JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 50, 
inclusive, fictitious name defendants, jointly, 
severally, and in the alternative 
 
(Camden New Jersey District Civil No. 93-260) 
 
SERGEANT DONNA M. HURLEY; PATRICK K. HURLEY, 
wife and husband 
 
v. 
 
THE ATLANTIC CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, 
a subdivision of the City of Atlantic City; 
HENRY MADAMBA; NICHOLAS V. RIFICE; 
JOHN MOONEY; JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 50, 
inclusive, jointly, severally, and in the alternative 
 
(Camden, New Jersey District Civil No. 94-1122) 
 
Henry Madamba, 
       Appellant No. 96-5634 
 
SERGEANT DONNA M. HURLEY; PATRICK K. HURLEY, 
husband and wife, 
 
v. 
 
THE ATLANTIC CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, 
a subdivision of the City of Atlantic City; 
HENRY MADAMBA; NICHOLAS V. RIFICE; 
JOHN MOONEY; JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 50, 
inclusive, fictitious name defendants, jointly, 
severally, and in the alternative 
 
(Camden New Jersey District Civil No. 93-260) 
 
SERGEANT DONNA M. HURLEY; PATRICK K. HURLEY, 
wife and husband 
 
v. 
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THE ATLANTIC CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, 
a subdivision of the City of Atlantic City; 
HENRY MADAMBA; NICHOLAS V. RIFICE; 
JOHN MOONEY; JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 50, 
inclusive, jointly, severally, and in the alternative 
 
(Camden New Jersey District Civil No. 94-1122) 
 
Donna M. Hurley, and Patrick K. Hurley, 
       Appellants No. 96-5661 
 
SERGEANT DONNA M. HURLEY; PATRICK K. HURLEY, 
husband and wife, 
 
v. 
 
THE ATLANTIC CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, 
a subdivision of the City of Atlantic City; 
HENRY MADAMBA; NICHOLAS V. RIFICE; 
JOHN MOONEY; JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 50, 
inclusive, fictitious name defendants, jointly, 
severally, and in the alternative 
 
(Camden New Jersey District Civil No. 93-260) 
 
SERGEANT DONNA M. HURLEY; PATRICK K. HURLEY, 
wife and husband 
 
v. 
 
THE ATLANTIC CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, 
a subdivision of the City of Atlantic City; 
HENRY MADAMBA; NICHOLAS V. RIFICE; 
JOHN MOONEY; JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 50, 
inclusive, jointly, severally, and in the alternative 
 
(Camden, New Jersey District Civil No. 94-1122) 
 
Donna M. Hurley, and Patrick K. Hurley, 
       Appellants No. 96-5738 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Nos. 93-cv-00260, 94-cv-01122) 
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Argued May 4, 1998 
Reargued October 5, 1998 
 
BEFORE: BECKER, Chief Judge, SCIRICA and COWEN, 
Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed March 18, 1999) 
 
V. The Hurleys' Remaining Claims 
 
Hurley argues that the district court abused its discretion 
by denying her motion for an additur. While the basis for 
her claim is not entirely clear, she appears to suggest that 
she is entitled to an additur because the district court's 
jury charge erroneously limited liability to the accrual 
period (January 20, 1987 through January 20, 1993), even 
though there was ample evidence in the record that 
defendants continued to harass her through the end of 
trial. Although she has filed a related action to include 
these later claims, she has advised the court "that she 
would be willing to forego her compensatory claims in that 
other action were this Court to exercise its appellate 
jurisdiction in the form of an additur." Appellee's Br. at 38- 
39. Yet the Hurleys filed their original complaint in this 
action on January 20, 1993. Since that date, they have not 
amended their complaint to include any claims for conduct 
that occurred after that time; those claims remain in their 
related action. Clearly, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion by denying an additur based on claims that were 
never before the court. 
 
Hurley next claims that the district court erred by 
denying her prejudgment interest on the remitted 
compensatory award. In Coleman v. Kaye, 87 F.3d 1491 (3d 
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 754 (1997), we 
considered whether a plaintiff could recover prejudgment 
interest against the County of Monmouth after a jury found 
the County liable under the LAD for intentional sexual 
discrimination. In rejecting such an award, we observed: 
 
       Nor can prejudgment interest be assessed against the 
       County of Monmouth. The court rule that Coleman 
 
                                58 
  
       invokes expressly provides that prejudgment interest 
       will not be awarded against a public entity "[e]xcept 
       where provided by statute . . . ." N.J. Ct. R. 4:42-11(b). 
       There is no statutory authorization in New Jersey for 
       such an award. To the contrary, as the New Jersey 
       Appellate Division stated in Maynard v. Mine Hill 
       Township, 244 N.J. Super. 298, 582 A.2d 315, 318 
       (App. Div. 1990), the New Jersey Tort Claims Act 
       "specifically prohibits prejudgment interest against 
       government tortfeasors." 
 
Id. at 1511-12 (citation omitted). Accordingly, we will affirm 
the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion for 
prejudgment interest. 
 
Mr. Hurley argues that the district court erred by 
granting summary judgment on his loss of consortium 
claim under the LAD. Specifically, he asserts that the LAD 
permits recovery of all damages available under the 
common law, and a claim for loss of consortium is"more 
accurately described as an element of damage rather than 
a separate cause of action . . . ." Appellee's Br. at 42. He 
further asserts that a claim for loss of consortium under 
the LAD effectuates the remedial purposes of the statute by 
providing compensation for the damage done to his marital 
relationship. 
 
Although the New Jersey Supreme Court has not 
answered the question of whether per quod damages for 
loss of consortium are recoverable under the LAD, the 
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division,firmly 
rejected such a claim in Catalane v. Gilian Instrument 
Corp., 638 A.2d 1341 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994). 
Specifically, the court held that "the Legislature did not 
intend to establish a cause of action for any person other 
than the individual against whom the discrimination was 
directed." Id. at 1353 (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. S 10:5-3); cf. 
Flaherty v. Enclave, 605 A.2d 301, 305 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law 
Div. 1992) (per quod damages are not recoverable under the 
Conscientious Employee Protection Act, or "whistleblower" 
statute). In reaching this conclusion, the Catalane court 
reasoned that "[i]f per quod claims were to be allowed under 
the Act, the Legislature would have so noted in light of its 
careful recitation of the damages it intended to allow." 
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Catalane, 638 A.2d at 1353. Because the court's holding 
rests on a sensible reading of the LAD, we predict that the 
New Jersey Supreme Court would follow Catalane and 
conclude that the LAD makes no provision for such an 
ancillary claim. Accordingly, the district court properly 
granted summary judgment as to Mr. Hurley's loss of 
consortium claim. 
 
Finally, plaintiff's counsel argues that the district court 
erred by setting his hourly rate at $200, rather than his 
requested hourly rate of $300. Counsel contends that, 
although his requested rate was supported by an 
independent affidavit, the court instead relied on "an 
unsworn hearsay letter from a senior partner in a law firm 
that routinely defends Atlantic City Police Department 
representatives." Appellee's Br. at 40. Counsel further 
contends that the court based the $200 rate on a 
generalized sense of what is customary and proper, rather 
than on appropriate record evidence. 
 
We review the reasonableness of an award of attorney's 
fees for an abuse of discretion.34 See Smith v. Philadelphia 
Housing Auth., 107 F.3d 223, 225 (3d Cir. 1997); 
Washington v. Philadelphia County Ct. of Common Pleas, 89 
F.3d 1031, 1034 (3d Cir. 1996). As we observed in Smith: 
 
       [A] district court may not set attorneys' fees based 
       upon a generalized sense of what is customary or 
       proper, but rather must rely upon the record. The 
       plaintiff bears the burden of producing sufficient 
       evidence of what constitutes a reasonable market rate 
       for the essential character and complexity of the legal 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
34. Although "[t]he New Jersey approach to the issue of contingency 
enhancement under the LAD is a marked departure from the Supreme 
Court's interpretation and application of federal fee-shifting statutes," 
Coleman, 87 F.3d at 1511 (citing Rendine v. Pantzer, 661 A.2d 1202 
(N.J. 1995)), the New Jersey Supreme Court's approach to reviewing the 
calculation of hourly rates under the LAD is generally similar to the 
approach taken by this court when reviewing the calculation of hourly 
rates under federal fee-shifting statutes. See Rendine, 661 A.2d at 1227 
(citing Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990)). 
Accordingly, we will review the district court's hourly-rate calculation 
in 
light of federal precedent. 
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       services rendered in order to make out a prima facie 
       case. Once the plaintiff has carried this burden, 
       defendant may contest that prima facie case only with 
       appropriate record evidence. In the absence of such 
       evidence, the plaintiff must be awarded attorney's fees 
       at her requested rate. If the hourly rates are disputed, 
       the district court must conduct a hearing to determine 
       the reasonable market rates. 
 
107 F.3d at 225 (quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 
In the present matter, the district court found that the 
proposed fees of plaintiff 's counsel were excessive for the 
following reasons: 
 
       The defendants have submitted an affidavit 
       accompanied by a letter from Jack Plackter, Esq., of 
       the law firm of Horn, Goldberg, Gorny, Daniels, 
       Plackter & Weiss. Mr. Plackter writes that his firm 
       charges the following rates: partners, $95-$225; 
       associates, $85-$150; paralegals, law clerks, and other 
       unlicensed legal assistants, $50-$70. 
 
        We believe that Mr. Plackter's submitted rates 
       provide a more suitable framework in which to set fees. 
       Based on Mr. Plackter's letter, the other evidence in the 
       record, the Court's close familiarity with the New 
       Jersey legal market, our direct experience with Mr. Van 
       Syoc and his employees, and applicable case law, we 
       will apply the following hourly rates: Mr. Van Syoc: 
       $200.00; Mr. Folkman: $150.00; Mr. Blaker: $115.00; 
       Junior Associates (Allen, Kopelson, Erdek, Byler): 
       $85.00; Law Clerks and Paralegals: $50.00. 
 
933 F. Supp. at 428. 
 
To the extent that the district court's calculation of 
hourly rates was based on a "generalized sense of what is 
customary and proper," rather than on evidence in the 
record, it was error. Smith, 107 F.3d at 225. However, 
because defendants submitted an affidavit to contest the 
hourly rates, and because plaintiff's counsel waived any 
right to a hearing on this issue,35 we cannot conclude that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
35. The district court explicitly provided that the parties could have a 
hearing on the attorney's fee issue if they requested one, see Hurley, 933 
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the district court abused its discretion in concluding that 
the $200 hourly rate is proper under the circumstances. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the district court's order 
granting plaintiff attorney's fees subject to a reduced rate. 
However, in light of our decisions with respect to the 
individual defendants in this case, we will vacate the fee 
award order insofar as it established the total hours worked 
on successful claims and the total fee award and remand 
for reconsideration. 
 
VI. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the amended 
judgment insofar as it imposes liability on the ACPD. 
However, we will vacate the amended judgment to the 
extent it awards punitive damages against the ACPD and 
order a new trial on this issue. Moreover, we will vacate the 
amended judgments entered against defendant Madamba 
and in favor of defendant Rifice, but affirm the district 
court's order granting Mooney's motion for summary 
judgment. Finally, we will affirm the district court's orders 
dismissing Mr. Hurley's loss of consortium claim, denying 
plaintiff's motions for prejudgment interest and an additur, 
and granting plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees subject to 
a reduced hourly rate. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
F. Supp. at 429 n.31, but the record does not reveal that any such 
hearing ever occurred. Moreover, plaintiff's counsel has not argued for 
a hearing on appeal. Instead, he continues to argue that he is entitled 
to his proposed hourly rate of $300 because defendants have not 
submitted appropriate record evidence to challenge this rate. This 
amounts to a waiver. See Williams v. Butler, 802 F.2d 296, 301 (8th Cir. 
1986) (en banc), vacated on other grounds sub nom. City of Little Rock v. 
Williams, 485 U.S. 931 (1988). 
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COWEN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part, and dissenting in 
part. 
 
I agree with the majority that a new trial is necessary 
with respect to defendants Madamba and Rifice. I also 
agree that the District Court's instruction to the jury 
regarding liability for punitive damages under the New 
Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("LAD") constituted plain 
error, and that the District Court properly dismissed Mr. 
Hurley's loss of consortium claim, denied plaintiff's motion 
for prejudgment interest and an additur, and granted 
plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees subject to a reduced 
hourly rate. 
 
I must respectfully part company with the majority, 
however, insofar as they affirm the judgment of liability 
against the ACPD. The District Court instructed the jury 
that it could find Madamba and the ACPD liable based on, 
among other theories, quid pro quo sexual harassment. But 
the District Court's instruction on this subject was 
erroneous because it did not require that the juryfind that 
plaintiff suffered a tangible employment action as a result 
of her refusal to submit to her supervisor's sexual 
demands. Moreover, even if the jury instruction was 
correct, there is simply no evidence to support plaintiff 's 
quid pro quo claim. Because the jury was asked only to 
return a general verdict as to the defendants' liability 
without specifying which theory of liability it credited, it is 
possible that the jury assessed liability against the ACPD 
based on a legally and factually flawed theory. Under these 
circumstances, both Supreme Court and Third Circuit 
authority require that we vacate the judgment against the 
ACPD. The majority's adoption of a harmless error doctrine 
to salvage the tainted general verdict in this case is both 
contrary to precedent and exceedingly unwise. 
 
I also dissent from the majority's prediction of New Jersey 
law that there is no cause of action against individual 
supervisors for their own acts of sexual harassment under 
LAD S 10:5-12(a). Numerous decisions of the New Jersey 
courts, including the New Jersey Supreme Court itself, 
support Hurley's contention that supervisors such as Rifice 
and Madamba are "employer[s]" within the meaning of 
S 10:5-12(a). The majority's holding to the contrary 
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erroneously substitutes our assessment of the LAD in place 
of the New Jersey courts' interpretation of their own 
statute. Finally, because there is sufficient evidence from 
which a jury could conclude that defendant Mooney aided 
and abetted Madamba and the ACPD in creating a hostile 
work environment, I would reverse the District Court's 
grant of summary judgment in his favor. 
 
I. Quid Pro Quo Liability 
 
The District Court charged the jury that the ACPD and 
Madamba could be liable based on four separate and 
distinct theories of sex discrimination: (i) intentional 
discrimination; (ii) hostile work environment; (iii) retaliation; 
and (iv) quid pro quo. With respect to quid pro quo sexual 
harassment, this court has held: 
 
       [U]nwelcome sexual advances, request for sexual 
       favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual 
       nature constitute [quid pro quo] sexual harassment 
       when (1) submission to such conduct is made either 
       explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an 
       individual's employment [or] (2) submission to or 
       rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as 
       the basis for employment decisions affecting such 
       individual. 
 
Bonenberger v. Plymouth Township, 132 F.3d 20, 27 (3d 
Cir. 1997) (internal quotation omitted). Similarly, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court, interpreting the LAD in Lehman v. 
Toys `R Us, 626 A.2d 445 (1993), stated that"quid pro quo 
sexual harassment occurs when an employer attempts to 
make an employee's submission to sexual demands a 
condition of his or her employment. It involves an implicit 
or explicit threat that if the employee does not accede to the 
sexual demands, he or she will lose his or her job, receive 
unfavorable performance reviews, be passed over for 
promotions, or suffer other adverse employment 
consequences." Id. at 452. 
 
Our understanding of quid pro quo sexual harassment 
has been altered by the Supreme Court's decision in 
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998). In 
Ellerth, the Court granted certiorari to decide whether a 
plaintiff may state a claim for quid pro quo sexual 
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harassment "where the plaintiff employee has neither 
submitted to the sexual advances of the alleged harasser 
nor suffered any tangible effects on the compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment as a 
consequence of a refusal to submit to those advances?" 118 
S. Ct. at 2265. Notwithstanding this question, the Court 
determined that the critical issue in the case was the scope 
of employer liability, not the contours of quid pro quo sexual 
harassment. As the Court made clear, for the purposes of 
determining employer liability, the categories of quid pro 
quo and hostile work environment are not controlling. Id. 
Still, the Court acknowledged that the categories"are 
relevant when there is a threshold question whether a 
plaintiff can prove discrimination" to the extent that "they 
illustrate the distinction between cases involving a threat 
which is carried out and offensive conduct in general." Id. 
According to the Supreme Court, cases such as Ellerth, 
which involve only unfilled threats and no tangible 
employment action, are properly categorized as hostile work 
environment claims, not quid pro quo claims. Id. 
Accordingly, to prove a claim of quid pro quo sexual 
harassment, a plaintiff must demonstrate either that she 
submitted to the sexual advances of her alleged harasser or 
suffered a tangible employment action as a result of her 
refusal to submit to those sexual advances. See Newton v. 
Cadwell Labs., 156 F.3d 880, 883 (8th Cir. 1998) 
(discussing quid pro quo claims after Ellerth); Ponticelli v. 
Zurich American Ins. Group, 16 F. Supp. 2d 414, 428 
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (same). 
 
In this case, the District Court instructed the jury 
regarding quid pro quo sexual harassment as follows: 
 
       Finally, quid pro quo sexual harassment. Loosely 
       translated, quid pro quo means, this for that. To prove 
       quid pro quo sexual harassment, plaintiff must prove 
       by a preponderance of the evidence that someone with 
       supervisory authority over her engaged in conduct that 
       conditioned tangible job benefits including 
       compensation, promotion, and other terms, conditions 
       or privileges of employment on submission to 
       unwelcome sexual conduct or penalized her for 
       refusing to participate in such conduct. 
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App. at A5280. Although the District Court's instruction 
would have been acceptable under Bonenberger and 
Lehman, it fails under Ellerth. Most problematically, the 
instruction did not require that plaintiff prove that she 
actually suffered a tangible employment action as a result 
of her refusal to submit to her supervisor's sexual 
advances. As the majority acknowledges, Maj. Op. at 37, 
the instruction permitted the jury to find liability for quid 
pro quo sexual harassment if a supervisor conditioned a 
tangible job benefit on plaintiff 's submission to a sexual 
demand, even if the supervisor never actually penalized 
plaintiff for her failure to submit. Because quid pro quo 
liability based on such unfulfilled threats is incompatible 
with Ellerth, the District Court's instruction on this subject 
was erroneous.1 
 
Even if the District Court's quid pro quo instruction could 
be read to require a finding that plaintiff actually suffered 
a tangible employment action as a result of her refusal to 
submit to her supervisor's sexual demands, the claim 
should not have been submitted to the jury because there 
is no evidence to support it. The only factual basis for 
plaintiff's quid pro quo claim is Madamba's statement to 
Hurley that women frequently sleep with their bosses in 
order to gain protection against sexual harassment. In the 
same conversation, Madamba also told plaintiff that he had 
lost weight by "having sex a few times a day" and that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Citing the fact that the LAD is "in some respects broader and more 
flexible than Title VII," the majority suggests that the New Jersey 
Supreme Court may reject Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 
118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998), and adhere to the view that the loss of a tangible 
employment benefit is not an essential element of a quid pro quo claim 
under the LAD. Maj. Op. at n.19. I wholeheartedly agree with the 
majority that the LAD is a remedial statute that should be liberally 
construed, but presented with no evidence that the New Jersey Supreme 
Court would reject two widely-heralded and watershed opinions of the 
United States Supreme Court, I believe the wiser course is to assume 
that the New Jersey Supreme Court will follow Ellerth and Faragher. 
Ironically, the majority abandons its expansive view of the LAD when it 
comes to predicting whether New Jersey law recognizes a cause of action 
against individual supervisors for their own acts of discrimination, even 
in the face of substantial evidence that New Jersey courts already 
recognize such a claim. See Infra Section II.A. 
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women came to him "when they're ready." Plaintiff 
contends, quite plausibly, that this conversation was a 
solicitation for sex. But this does not establish a quid pro 
quo claim unless plaintiff also proves that she suffered a 
tangible employment action as a result of her refusal to 
submit to Madamba's advances. There is simply no proof of 
this. Plaintiff has never even alleged that there is a causal 
connection between her failure to submit to Madamba's 
advances and any tangible employment action that she may 
have suffered.2 In light of Ellerth, plaintiff cannot maintain 
a quid pro quo claim, and defendants were entitled not to 
have this unsubstantiated theory submitted to the jury. 
 
The majority, while conceding that plaintiff's quid pro quo 
claim is "the least tenable of Hurley's claims," Maj. Op. at 
37, nevertheless attempts to justify its submission by 
suggesting that a reasonable jury could have determined 
that Madamba had plaintiff transferred from Charlie 
Platoon to a less desirable position in the Property and 
Evidence Unit because she refused his sexual advances. Id. 
at n.26. This theory, while imaginative, is without 
foundation in the record. Plaintiff has never argued, either 
to this Court or the District Court, that there was a nexus 
between that transfer and her failure to submit to 
Madamba's sexual advances.3 And for good reasons. 
According to plaintiff, Madamba's sexual overtures to her 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The District Court suggested that there was sufficient evidence to 
support plaintiff 's quid pro quo claim because plaintiff 's refusal to 
submit to Madamba's advances arguably resulted in the loss of the 
"tangible job benefit of being free from harassment." Hurley v. Atlantic 
City Police Dep't, 933 F. Supp. 396, 408 (D.N.J. 1996). This is a 
misapprehension of the concept of a tangible employment action, as 
Ellerth makes clear. "A tangible employment action constitutes a 
significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing 
to 
promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a 
decision causing a significant change in benefits." Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 
2268. "Being free from harassment" does not equate to any of these 
categories. 
 
3. Plaintiff argued to the District Court that the "transfer was in 
retaliation for complaints of harassment." App. at A5428 (plaintiff's 
statement of contested facts). Likewise, plaintiff has argued to this 
court 
that the transfer resulted from her "complain[ts] of sexual harassment." 
Hurley Letter, July 20, 1998 at 2. 
 
                                67 
  
occurred on March 26, 1990. Plaintiff testified that this 
date stood out in her mind because it was her husband's 
birthday. App. at A2497:4-6. But plaintiff was not 
transferred to the Property and Evidence Unit until 
November 8, 1990, approximately one week after she 
submitted a memorandum in which she detailed the 
harassment that she suffered at Charlie Platoon and 
requested a transfer. Hurley, 933 F. Supp. at 406. In 
addition, the transfer was authorized by the Acting Chief of 
Police, not by Madamba, who as a captain did not have the 
authority to transfer plaintiff or anyone else. Accordingly, 
while plaintiff has argued, and a reasonable jury could 
conclude, that plaintiff 's transfer to the Property and 
Evidence Unit was in retaliation for her sexual harassment 
complaints, the notion that the transfer was somehow 
connected to plaintiff 's failure to submit to Madamba's 
sexual advances over seven months earlier is implausible in 
the extreme, and no reasonable jury could so find based on 
the present record. 
 
We are thus presented with a situation where a jury has 
returned a general verdict of liability against the 
defendants, but one of the theories on which that verdict 
may have rested was both improperly presented and was 
not supported by the evidence. Under these circumstances, 
our precedents could not be more clear. "Where a jury has 
returned a general verdict and one theory of liability is not 
sustained by the evidence or legally sound, the verdict 
cannot stand because the court cannot determine whether 
the jury based its verdict on an improper ground." Wilburn 
v. Maritrans GP Inc., 139 F.3d 350, 361 (3d Cir. 1998); see 
also Brokerage Concepts v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 140 F.3d 
494, 534 (3d Cir. 1998); Limbach Co. v. Sheet Metal 
Workers Int'l Assoc., 949 F.2d 1211, 1217-18 (3d Cir. 1991) 
("Under this court's jurisprudence, we must set aside a 
general verdict if it was based on two or more independent 
grounds one of which was insufficient, and we cannot 
determine whether the jury relied on the valid ground."), 
aff'd on rehearing en banc, 949 F.2d 1241 (3d Cir. 1991); 
Carden v. Westinghouse v. Electric Corp., 850 F.2d 996, 
1000 (3d Cir. 1988); Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637, 646 (3d 
Cir. 1980); Simko v. C & C Marine Maintenance Co., 594 
 
                                68 
  
F.2d 960, 967 (3d Cir. 1979); Albergo v. Reading Co., 372 
F.2d 83, 86 (3d Cir. 1967). 
 
Our decision in Carden, 850 F.2d at 996, is illustrative. 
In that case, plaintiff sued his former employer for age 
discrimination. At trial, plaintiff pressed two different 
theories: first, direct evidence of intentional discrimination; 
and second, circumstantial evidence of discrimination 
under the burden-shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas v. 
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The jury returned a general 
verdict in plaintiff 's favor. On appeal, defendants 
successfully argued that the only testimony supporting 
plaintiff's intentional discrimination claim was erroneously 
admitted into evidence by the district court, and that 
without such testimony, there was insufficient evidence to 
support the claim of intentional discrimination. Although 
we recognized that there was more than sufficient evidence 
to support plaintiff's McDonnell Douglas claim, we 
nonetheless concluded that the general nature of the jury's 
verdict necessitated a new trial: 
 
       Significantly, the jury's liability interrogatory, and 
       hence the jury's answer, is in effect a general verdict. 
       It did not distinguish between the two theories on 
       which the district court charged: i.e. liability predicated 
       on a finding of intentional discrimination, or liability 
       predicated on an indirect finding grounded in the 
       three-part McDonnell Douglas formula. Thus, unless 
       we are satisfied that Carden proved both direct and 
       indirect liability on the part of Westinghouse, we are 
       compelled to reverse the judgment because the jury's 
       verdict, general in nature, may have rested exclusively 
       on a ground that is not supported by evidence. . . . In 
       our jurisprudence it has been established that a general 
       verdict must be set aside where the jury has been 
       instructed that it could rely on two or more independent 
       grounds or claims and one of those grounds or claims 
       turns out to be insufficient. 
 
Id. at 999-1000 (emphasis added) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 
The Supreme Court has been equally consistent in 
holding that a general verdict in a civil case must be 
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reversed if any of the claims submitted to the jury are 
found to be unsound. Over a century ago, the Court 
explained that the general verdict's "generality prevents us 
from perceiving upon which plea they found. If, therefore, 
upon any one issue, error was committed, either in the 
admission of evidence or in the charge of the court, the 
verdict cannot be upheld . . .." Maryland v. Baldwin, 112 
U.S. 490, 493 (1884). Since Baldwin, the Supreme Court 
has reaffirmed this rule, without exception, on at least 
three separate occasions. See Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. 
Winckler & Smith Citrus Prods. Co., 370 U.S. 19, 29-30 
(1962); United New York & New Jersey Sandy Hook Pilots 
Assoc. v. Kalecki, 358 U.S. 613, 618-19 (1959); Wilmington 
Star Mining Co. v. Fulton, 205 U.S. 60, 78-79 (1907). 
Applying this well-settled principle to the facts of this case 
leads to the inevitable conclusion that the verdict against 
the ACPD and Madamba should be vacated because we do 
not know whether those defendants were found liable based 
on a quid pro quo theory that is both legally and factually 
defective. 
 
Faced with the clear command of our prior cases, as well 
as the governing Supreme Court doctrine, the majority 
holds that even if plaintiff's quid pro quo claim was 
erroneously presented to the jury and lacked evidentiary 
support, the judgment against the ACPD should still be 
affirmed because, the majority declares, "no jury would 
have found the defendants liable based solely on[the] quid 
pro quo" claim, and therefore, "any error was harmless." 
Maj. Op. at 38. Although the majority claims that this is 
not a new rule, the fact of the matter is that prior to today's 
decision, this court has never relied on a harmless error 
analysis to affirm a general verdict that may have rested on 
an improper ground.4 It is remarkable that after more than 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The single Third Circuit decision cited by the majority in support of 
its 
position is inapposite. In Murray v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 145 
F.3d 143 (3d Cir. 1998), our prediction of New Jersey law rendered the 
district court's jury charge erroneous, but we concluded that the jury 
verdict should nonetheless be affirmed because"the findings necessarily 
implied by the jury's verdict under the incorrect instructions make clear 
that the jury would have reached the same conclusion under the correct 
instructions . . .." Id. at 145-46. Here, in contrast, there is nothing in 
the 
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one hundred years of reviewing civil judgments founded on 
general verdicts, the majority believes that we have only 
now come upon the case that calls for such drastic action. 
I do not believe that that day has arrived. 
 
The majority concludes that the evidence to support 
plaintiff's hostile work environment claim -- the sexually 
explicit graffiti and the sanitary napkin incident, in 
particular -- is so strong that there is no possibility that 
the jury assessed liability against the ACPD based solely on 
Madamba's alleged sexual advances. No one, save the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
jury's general verdict that would support the notion that they would have 
reached the same result had the matter been submitted without the 
faulty quid pro quo claim. In addition, Murray was not a case involving 
a general verdict that may have been predicated on erroneous grounds, 
and it accordingly sheds no light on the issue presented herein. 
 
I recognize that on rare occasion, some of our sister circuits, utilizing 
a harmless error analysis, have affirmed general verdicts that were 
tainted by defective claims. See Kern v. Levolor Lorentzen, Inc. 899 F.2d 
772 (9th Cir. 1990); Traver v. Meshriy, 627 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1980); 
Collum v. Butler, 421 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1970); American Airlines, Inc. 
v. United States, 418 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1969). Most of the circuits, 
however, have strictly adhered to the general rule announced in 
Baldwin. See Kern, 899 F.2d at 790 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citing 
cases). In particular, I note that Asbill v. Housing Authority of Choctaw 
Nation of Oklahoma, 726 F.2d 1499 (10th Cir. 1984), relied on by the 
majority for the allegedly "long [ ]acknowledged" proposition that Baldwin 
does not preclude the possibility of harmless error review, no longer 
represents the prevailing view of the Tenth Circuit. See Anixter v. Home- 
Stake Production Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1229 (10th Cir. 1996) ("Although in 
the past we allowed jury verdicts to stand if the improper instruction 
was harmless . . . more recently we have adhered strictly to the general 
rule and have remanded cases where we could not say`with absolute 
certainty' that the jury was not influenced by the submission of improper 
and erroneous instruction.") (citations omitted); Farrell v. Klein Tools, 
Inc., 866 F.2d 1294, 1299-1301 (10th Cir. 1989) (acknowledging 
harmless error discussion in Asbill, but concluding that more recent 
cases left "no room for harmless error analysis," even though it was "very 
unlikely" that the erroneous jury instruction prejudiced defendant's 
"substantial rights"). In light of these cases, as well as the Supreme 
Court and Third Circuit precedents discussed in the text, I believe the 
majority's reliance on the sporadic harmless error cases from other 
circuits to be misplaced. 
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defendants perhaps, would dispute that plaintiff presented 
substantial evidence in support of her hostile work 
environment claim. But can any of us really purport to 
know how the jury viewed the evidence in this case? Any 
experienced trial lawyer can attest to the fact that juries 
sometimes view cases in suprising ways. Although one 
would not know it from the majority's opinion, according to 
the District Court, the facts in this matter were "hotly 
contested, and at trial there was conflicting evidence with 
respect to almost everything." Hurley, 933 F. Supp. at 404 
n.4. For example, the defendants produced evidence that 
the graffiti, though by all accounts appalling, was promptly 
removed when ACPD supervisory personnel learned of its 
existence. There was also evidence that the graffiti was 
directed at both male and female officers. The sanitary 
napkin incident was the subject of conflicting testimony as 
well: several police officers testified that Madamba, upon 
seeing the display, immediately had it taken down and 
adamantly instructed his officers to cease such behavior. 
The point, of course, is not whether my colleagues or I 
would have credited these explanations if we were jurors; it 
is that the actual jurors in this case, consistent with their 
oaths and the instructions of the District Court, could have 
accepted the ACPD's defense to the hostile work 
environment claim, but still assessed liability on the faulty 
quid pro quo claim because they were convinced that 
Madamba propositioned Hurley for sex and threatened to 
retaliate if she did not submit. To recognize that this 
scenario may have occurred does not presume "total illogic" 
on behalf of the jury, as the majority asserts. Maj. Op. at 
38. To the contrary, it assumes only that the jury carefully 
considered the evidence and followed the instructions of the 
District Court.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Even assuming that the jury did not find the ACPD and Madamba 
liable solely on the defective quid pro quo claim, its submission could 
have effected the jury's deliberations in less obvious ways. For example, 
the jurors may have been inclined to award more compensatory damages 
because they wrongly believed that the defendants had committed 
multiple forms of sexual harassment against plaintiff. The fact that the 
District Court felt compelled to remit the compensatory damages award 
from $575,000 to $175,000 is some indication that this may have 
occurred. 
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The invocation of a harmless error rule in this case is 
particularly misguided because it will produce no benefit to 
either the judicial system or the parties. As the Supreme 
Court has recognized, the chief justification of the harmless 
error doctrine is the conservation of judicial resources. See 
United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499, 509 (1983) 
(quoting R. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error 81 
(1970)); see also 11 Wright et al., Federal Practice and 
Procedure S 2881 at 443 ("The theory of the harmless-error 
rule generally is that procedure is a practical means to an 
end, the requirements of which should be no more exacting 
than efficiency requires."). But in this case, as a 
consequence of our decision to vacate the punitive damages 
award against the ACPD and the liability judgments against 
Madamba and in favor of Rifice, the entire matter will have 
to be re-presented to a new jury. There is thus no efficiency 
advantage to support the majority's approach. Nor will the 
parties themselves be well-served by today's decision. The 
ACPD, for obvious reasons, would rather present their 
evidence to a new jury without defending against an 
unsubstantiated claim. Even the plaintiff, however, by 
being deprived of an opportunity to have a single jury 
review all of her claims and, if appropriate, assess both 
compensatory and punitive damages, will be disadvantaged 
by the majority's limited affirmance of only the remitted 
compensatory damages award against the ACPD. 
 
Finally, I am very concerned that the majority's newly- 
minted harmless error analysis will invite further efforts by 
appellate judges, in even more difficult cases, to divine 
what a jury may have been thinking when it rendered a 
general verdict. Although the majority emphasizes that their 
decision to employ a harmless-error doctrine is founded 
upon the "extreme" facts of this case, Maj. Op. at 41, that 
is simply to say that we will only affirm a tainted general 
verdict in the future where we believe that the jury has 
reached an obviously correct result. Because I believe that 
we have no role in speculating how a jury might have 
viewed the evidence presented at trial, and that such 
attempts at judicial telepathy are unwise and contrary to 
our precedents, I respectfully dissent from the majority's 
decision to affirm the judgment against the ACPD. 
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II. Individual Liability Under the New Jersey Law 
Against Discrimination 
 
A. 
 
In ordering a new trial for defendants Rifice and 
Madamba, the majority has concluded that the only basis 
for individual liability under the LAD is S 10:5-12(e), which 
prohibits any person from aiding and abetting an act 
prohibited by the LAD. In reaching this conclusion, the 
majority has predicted that the New Jersey Supreme Court 
would not recognize a cause of action against an individual 
supervisor under S 10:5-12(a), which makes it unlawful for 
any "employer" to discriminate on the basis of, among other 
things, sex. Maj. Op. at 45-46. The majority believes that 
interpreting S 10:5-12(a) to provide for individual liability of 
supervisors would not substantially further the purposes of 
anti-discrimination law and would be inconsistent with the 
prevailing interpretation of Title VII, which does not give 
rise to individual liability. See Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de 
Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1077-787 (3d Cir. 1996). 
Because I find these reasons unconvincing in light of the 
many New Jersey state court cases which strongly suggest 
that New Jersey law recognizes a cause of action against 
individual supervisors for their own acts of discrimination, 
I dissent from the majority's holding to the contrary. 
 
At the outset, it is worth noting that, viewed purely as a 
matter of statutory construction, there is a more than 
credible argument that the term "employer," as used in 
N.J.S.A. S 10:5-12(a), was intended to encompass individual 
supervisors. The governing definition of "employer" under 
the LAD is found at N.J.S.A. S 10:5-5(e) and provides as 
follows: 
 
       `Employer' includes all persons as defined in 
       subsection a. of this section unless otherwise 
       specifically exempt under another section of this act, 
       and includes the State, any political or civil subdivision 
       thereof, and all public officers, agencies, boards or 
       bodies. 
 
Subsection (a) of S 10:5-5, in turn, states: 
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       `Person' includes one or more individuals, 
       partnerships, associations, organizations, labor 
       organizations, corporations, legal representatives, 
       trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, receivers, and 
       fiduciaries. 
 
Based on these definitions, which indirectly define an 
"employer" as "one or more individuals," it is reasonable to 
conclude, as plaintiff urges, that the New Jersey legislature 
intended to include individuals acting on behalf of their 
employer (i.e., supervisors) within the coverage of the 
statute. This is particularly so given the legislature's 
instruction that the LAD is to be "liberally construed," 
N.J.S.A. S 10:5-3, and the New Jersey Supreme Court's 
repeated recognition that "the goal of the LAD[is] `nothing 
less than the eradication of the cancer of discrimination.' " 
See Taylor v. Metzger, 706 A.2d 685, 693 (N.J. 1998) 
(quoting Hernandez v. Region Nine Hous. Corp., 684 A.2d 
1385 (N.J. 1996)) (additional citations omitted). Indeed, in 
this case, plaintiff has an especially compelling argument 
that defendants Rifice and Madamba ought to be subject to 
liability under S 10:5-12(a) because "public officers" are 
specifically included in the S 10:5-5(e) definition of 
"employer." Although "public officers" is not defined in the 
LAD, it is difficult to conceive of a definition of that term 
that does not encompass a police inspector and a police 
captain, which are, respectively, the second and third 
highest ranking positions in the Atlantic City Police 
Department. 
 
All of this is to say that, even if we did not have the 
benefit of New Jersey state court decisions and were 
completely left to our own devices, the question of whether 
Rifice and Madamba could be liable under LAD S 10:5-12(a) 
is, as the majority acknowledges, a close one. Maj. Op. at 
45-46. But see Tyson v. Cigna Corp., 918 F. Supp. 836, 839 
(D.N.J. 1996) (holding that S 10-5:12(a) does not provide for 
individual liability because it "does not include any of the 
phrases that so clearly provide a basis for individual 
liability under other subparts" of LAD). In matters involving 
state law, however, our role is not to interpret a statute as 
we deem it appropriate; instead, we must apply the law in 
a manner that is consistent with the interpretation given to 
 
                                75 
  
it by the state's highest court. Where, as here, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court has not explicitly addressed the 
issue, we must "forecast the position" of that court. Clark 
v. Modern Group Ltd., 9 F.3d 321, 326 (3d Cir. 1993). In 
doing so, we should consider, inter alia, decisions of the 
New Jersey intermediate appellate courts as well as"[t]he 
`carefully considered statement[s]' of the Supreme Court in 
dicta." Travelers Indem. Co. of Illinois v. DiBartolo, 131 F.3d 
343, 348 (3rd Cir. 1997) (quoting McKenna v. Ortho Pharm. 
Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 662 n. 21 (3d Cir. 1980)). 
 
There have been at least four decisions of the New Jersey 
Supreme Court in which individual supervisors were sued 
under the LAD for their own discriminatory acts. See Taylor 
v. Metzger, 706 A.2d 685 (N.J. 1998); Payton v. New Jersey 
Turnpike Authority, 691 A.2d 321 (N.J. 1997) (employee 
brought LAD action against her employer and two of her 
supervisors for sexual harassment); Montells v. Haynes, 
627 A.2d 654 (N.J. 1993) (employee brought suit against 
employer, supervisor, and others asserting claims for 
personal injuries and sexual harassment under the LAD); 
Lehman v. Toys `R' Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445 (N.J. 1993) 
(former employee brought action against employer, 
supervisor, and personnel director, alleging hostile work 
environment sexual harassment in violation of the LAD). 
Most recently, in Taylor, 706 A.2d 685, the Supreme Court 
permitted plaintiff, a county sheriff's officer, to sue the 
county sheriff, her supervisor, for creating a racially hostile 
work environment based on the sheriff's use of the term 
"jungle bunny" to describe plaintiff. The central legal issue 
addressed in Taylor was whether the utterance of a single 
derogatory racial comment by a supervisor could support a 
hostile work environment claim under the LAD, but implicit 
in the decision is the proposition that a supervisor is liable 
for his or her own discriminatory behavior. This follows 
from the court's observation that: "[a] supervisor has a 
unique role in shaping the work environment. Part of a 
supervisor's duty is to prevent, avoid, and rectify invidious 
harassment in the workplace." Id. at 691. Although the 
majority relies on Taylor for its conclusion that a supervisor 
can be liable as an aider and abettor of discrimination 
under LAD S 10:5-12(e), nowhere in the Taylor opinion does 
the court characterize the defendant as an aider and 
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abettor or suggest that any other individual or entity is 
principally liable. Given this omission, the more reasonable 
inference to draw from Taylor, as well as the other cases in 
which supervisors were sued in their individual capacities 
under the LAD, is that the Supreme Court has endorsed 
the concept of supervisory liability under LAD S 10:5-12(a). 
 
The decisions of the Appellate Division support an 
identical conclusion. Muench v. Township of Haddon, 605 
A.2d 242 (App. Div. 1992), is particularly instructive. In 
that case, plaintiff alleged that while working as a 
probationary dispatcher with the Haddon Township Police 
Department, she was subjected to a hostile work 
environment by Joseph Tortoreto, a police officer who had 
been assigned to train her. Despite plaintiff's complaints to 
Chief of Police Robert Saunders and Tortoreto's supervisor, 
Sergeant Walter Aaron, the harassment continued until 
plaintiff was forced to resign. Plaintiff then brought suit 
under the LAD against Haddon Township, the Haddon 
Police Department, Chief Saunders, Sergeant Aaron, and 
Tortoreto. While the main legal issue in the case was 
whether plaintiff could maintain a hostile work environment 
claim in the absence of overt sexual conduct, the court's 
opinion, which cites, quotes, and discusses S 10:5-12(a), id. 
at 246, but not the aiding and abetting provision ofS 10:5- 
12(e), makes plain that supervisors are individually liable 
under the LAD. As the court stated: 
 
       [T]here is no question that `management-level 
       employees,' Chief Saunders and Sergeant Aaron, had 
       been told by plaintiff of Tortoreto's conduct during 
       plaintiff 's probationary period, and that no corrective 
       steps were taken. Indeed, the trial court found that 
       plaintiff complained to the chief `on two occasions' and 
       the chief did nothing about it. Since the evidence 
       established that supervisory personnel were on notice 
       of the alleged harassment and failed to take corrective 
       steps, defendants, including Haddon Township, are 
       subject to liability under the LAD. 
 
Id. at 249. 
 
Other decisions of the Appellate Division likewise support 
the notion of individual supervisory liability under LAD 
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S 10:5-12(a). See Maiorino v. Schering-Plough Corp., 695 
A.2d 353 (App. Div. 1997) (affirming judgment of 
compensatory damages in LAD action against plaintiff's 
former employer and supervisors); Herbert v. Haytaian, 678 
A.2d 1183 (App. Div. 1996) (state employee brought LAD 
claim for sexual harassment against the State of New 
Jersey and former speaker of the General Assembly); Wilson 
v. Parisi, 633 A.2d 113 (App. Div. 1993) (reversing grant of 
summary judgment to defendants in LAD sexual 
harassment claim brought by high school teacher against 
high school principal and board of education). 
 
In sum, the above cases provide more than ample 
evidence that, under LAD S 10:5-12(a), a supervisor may be 
individually liable for his or her own discriminatory acts. I 
would therefore hold that on remand, defendants Rifice and 
Madamba are subject to individual liability under LAD 
S 10:5-12(a), as well as the aiding and abetting provision of 
LAD S 10:5-12(e). While I do not reject the possibility that 
the New Jersey Supreme Court, when squarely presented 
with this issue in a future case, could decide otherwise, I 
am convinced that, given our obligation to be sensitive to 
the doctrinal trends of the state courts in the application of 
state law, the majority has erred in its prediction on this 
subject. I therefore dissent. 
 
B. 
 
Finally, I do not agree with the majority's decision to 
affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment to 
defendant Mooney. LAD S 10:5-12(e) provides that it is 
unlawful "for any person, whether an employer and 
employee or not, to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the 
doing of any of the acts forbidden under this act, or 
attempt to do so." This provision could not be more clear in 
creating liability for any person who aids and abets a 
violation of the act, whether the individual is a supervisor, 
a nonsupervisory employee, or even an individual who is 
not an employee of the entity that is principally liable for 
discrimination. 
 
Despite the broad scope of the statute, the majority takes 
the position that a nonsupervisory employee cannot be 
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liable as an aider and abettor for his own affirmative acts 
of harassment because "such affirmative acts do not 
substantially assist the employer in its wrong, which is its 
failure to prevent and redress harassment by individual 
employees." Maj. Op. at 53 (emphasis in original). This 
statement is correct as far as it goes, but it overlooks the 
fact that in many sexual harassment cases, including this 
one, the employer's wrong is not only its failure to prevent 
and redress harassment by individual employees. An 
employer also commits a wrong when its supervisors, 
whose conduct is generally attributable to an employer 
because of their position in the organization, engage in 
harassing behavior. See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270; 
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2292 
(1998). It follows then that anyone who aids and abets 
harassment perpetrated by a supervisor that is attributable 
to an employer can themselves be liable under LAD S 10:5- 
12(e). 
 
Accordingly, while I agree with the majority that, as a 
nonsupervisory employee, Mooney cannot be said to have 
aided and abetted the ACPD in failing to respond to his own 
acts of sexual harassment, that lone observation does not 
settle the question of Mooney's liability. Contrary to the 
majority's view, the ACPD is not liable to plaintiff solely for 
its failure to prevent and remedy a hostile work 
environment; a reasonable jury could also find that the 
ACPD is liable to plaintiff on her hostile work environment 
claim based on Captain Madamba's affirmatively harassing 
actions, which, given his high rank, are attributable to the 
ACPD. To the extent then that Mooney aided and abetted 
Madamba in creating a hostile work environment, Mooney 
should be subject to liability under LAD S 10:5-12(e). Under 
our decision in Failla v. City of Passaic, 146 F.3d 149 (3d 
Cir. 1998), the relevant inquiry is whether Mooney 
"knowingly [gave] substantial assistance or encouragement" 
to Madamba's alleged discriminatory actions. Id. at 158. In 
my view, the evidence in the record is sufficient to support 
such a finding. For example, plaintiff testified that Mooney, 
in Madamba's presence, remarked that he had heard that 
Hurley "liked them hard and stiff." On another occasion, 
when plaintiff complained to Madamba that someone had 
stolen her coffee cup, Mooney asked plaintiff whether she 
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wanted to drink out of his jock cup. App. at A2514. 
Madamba apparently did not rebuke Mooney at all for this 
behavior. Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to 
plaintiff, a reasonable jury could find that Mooney gave 
substantial assistance or encouragement to Madamba's 
unlawful acts of harassment. The District Court's grant of 
summary judgment to Mooney should therefore be 
reversed. 
 
III. 
 
For the reasons stated above, I would vacate the 
judgment against the ACPD and remand for a new trial. In 
addition, while I agree that the case should be retried with 
respect to defendants Rifice and Madamba, on retrial, I 
would permit plaintiff to proceed against them under 
N.J.S.A. S 10:5-12(a) as well as N.J.S.A.S 10:5-12(e). I 
would also reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor 
of defendant Mooney. I respectfully dissent. 
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